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Since the Patent Act was revised in 1952, patent law has expanded to
cover an array of novel endeavors-new fields of technology (notably
computer science and business methods) as well as the activities of re-
searchers engaged in fundamental scientific discovery. These changes
have been accompanied by shifts in the organizational structure of the
technological community, with smaller firms and universities emerging
as important players in the patent system, and by new marketplace ex-
pectations arising from consumer demand for interoperable technology
and converging functionality. As a result of these developments, struc-
tural flaws in the legal order have become evident. Although the
technological community was once fairly united in its needs, the recent
debate over patent reform has made it clear that this is no longer the
case. The broad patents available for basic science present different
problems from those associated with the thickets of narrow rights
awarded in fields where advances are incremental. Boutique firms with
shifting alliances and universities with their spin-off enterprises rely on
patents for reasons that are inapplicable to vertically integrated compa-
nies that bring research, development, and distribution under one roof. In
some cases, a patent acquires value through technical superiority; in oth-
ers, it does so because it covers a product that is incorporated into a
standard or is subject to network effects, market tipping, or lock-in.
There are also vast disparities in patent-to-product ratios. In some fields,
like pharmaceuticals, the ratio is close to one (one patent covers one
product). But in other areas, that ratio can be vastly higher or lower: for
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example, a single electronic product can require a multiplicity of patent
licenses to bring to market;' at the same time, a gene patent can poten-
tially give rise to a multitude of products.2 In the last few years, it has
become increasingly difficult to believe that a one-size-fits-all approach
to patent law can survive.
There is no shortage of suggestions for making the legal environ-
ment responsive to the diverse experiences and demands of the
technological community. Some suggestions rely on adjudication to ac-
commodate such diversity. For example, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley
have highlighted various policy levers that the courts could use to create
a better fit between U.S. patent law and the technologies for which pro-
tection is sought.3 Thus, they suggest that the standard of the person
having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA) should be deployed more
discerningly; they suggest that this approach could, for example, distin-
guish between emerging and mature technologies.
Other proposals depend on legislative initiatives tied directly to the
features of innovation markets that warrant differential treatment. Draw-
ing on Wes Cohen's work on discrete and complex product industries,'
one can imagine law that differentiates on the basis of the patent-to-
product ratio. Thus, where the ratio is high, and potential holdouts are a
serious concern, special rules on remedies and compulsory licensing
may be appropriate.5 Where the ratio is extremely low, there may be a
need to prevent patentees from dominating more of a field than they can
efficiently exploit. Similarly, when a market is characterized by network
effects, compulsory licensing may be necessary to assure that all com-
petitors and potential entrants have access to the patented technology at
fair and reasonable rates.6
I. CLARK, J. ET AL., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT POOLS: A SOLU-
TION TO THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS? 14-15 (2000).
2. See, e.g., Helen M. Berman & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Reflections on the Science and
Law of Structural Biology, Genomics, and Drug Development, 53 UCLA L. REv. 871 (2006).
3. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent
Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003). In turn, of course, the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
would be expected to apply the differentiated standards articulated by the courts.
4. Wesley M. Cohen, Richard Nelson, & John P. Walsh, Protecting Their Intellectual
Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not), Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000; Wesley M. Cohen et al., R&D
Spillovers, Patents and the Incentives to Innovate in Japan and the United States, 31 RE-
SEARCH POLICY 1349 (2002).
5. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket. Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard-Setting, in I INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et. al.
eds., 2001).
6. See, e.g., Rochelle Dreyfuss, Unique Works/Unique Challenges at the Intellectual
Property/Competition Law Interface, in EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW ANNUAL 2005-THE
INTERACTION BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Claus-
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There are also suggestions for intervention along administrative
lines, through the laws and agencies that regulate industrial sectors
where a one-size system causes special problems. For instance, Rebecca
Eisenberg has suggested that the data-exclusivity regime administered by
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) might be used as a substitute
for patent protection.' Using a separate institutional device for different
industrial sectors could help break the impasse in patent reform caused
by the widening gap between the needs of the pharmaceutical industry
and the demands of the information technology sector.
The ability of national courts, legislators, or administrators to tailor
patent protection to reflect the differing concerns of different industries
is, however, circumscribed by international intellectual property obliga-
tions, most notably by the TRIPS Agreement. 8 In previous articles, we
have urged an interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement that recognizes
that the demands of innovation policy vary among countries and over
time, and suggested that WTO dispute settlement panels offer broad lati-
tude to member states to implement their core TRIPS patent obligations
in ways that optimize protection as circumstances change.9 In many
cases, we see the compliance issue as not whether industry-specific pat-
ent laws can be adopted, but the ways in which these rules are structured.
We begin with some background. The TRIPS Agreement contains
two types of provisions that constrain national choices. First, it articu-
lates a series of substantive minimum levels of patent protection that
WTO members are obliged to provide. For example, the term of patents
must endure for at least twenty years from the date an application is
filed.' o Even these provisions are not, however, absolute; rather, they of-
fer several opportunities for tailoring. For instance, there are provisions
that allow member states to reflect order public, or deal specially with
Dieter Ehlermann & Isabela Atanasiu, eds., 2006), available at http://papers.ssm.cornsol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=763688.
7. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Shifting Functional Balance of Patents and Drug Regu-
lation, 20 HEALTH AFFAIRS 119 (2001).
8. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights vol. 31, Apr.
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
9. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Patenting Science: Protecting
the Domain of Accessible Knowledge, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IN INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY (Lucie Guibault & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006); Graeme B. Dinwoodie &
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 36 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 95 (2005); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, WTO Dispute
Resolution and the Preservation of the Public Domain of Science Under International Law, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER GLOBALIZED INTEL-
LECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, (Keith E. Maskus and Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2006); Graeme
B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, International Intellectual Property Law and the Public
Domain of Science, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 431 (2004).
10. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 33.
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therapies, microorganisms, and plants." Indeed, the scope of the patent
section of the Agreement as a whole provides members with some flexi-
bility in that it applies only to inventions "capable of industrial
application."'' 2 Second, TRIPS constrains national lawmakers through a
series of structural provisions that appear to cut across the entire patent
system. For example, under Article 3, protection must be offered on a
national treatment basis, and Article 4 requires that member states pro-
vide protection on a most-favored nation basis. These structural
provisions are essentially provisions prohibiting discrimination.'
3
Unfortunately, Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement appears to de-
stroy this nice dichotomy. Its requirement that "patents shall be available
and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the ... field of
technology," does not fall neatly into either category. The travaux pr6-
paratoires of the TRIPS Agreement emphasize that the provision was
intended to guarantee protection for a variety of subject matter previ-
ously unprotected by patent rights in many countries. ' 4 In this regard, it
looks like a substantive minimum provision relating to subject matter.
But because the provision is cast in terms of nondiscrimination, it can
also be interpreted as structural. This ambiguity came to a head in Can-
ada-Protection of Pharmaceuticals Patents,'5 when a dispute settlement
panel of the WTO gave Article 27 broad structural effect, and required
exceptions to patent protection in Canadian law to comply not only with
the demands of Article 30, which explicitly regulates permissible excep-
tions from patent protection, but also with Article 27's protection against
technology-based discrimination.
To be sure, there are normative reasons to support this interpretation.
It essentially turns Article 27 into a pre-commitment strategy, binding
members to trans-substantive patent law as a way to prevent industries
11. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 27(2).
12. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 27(1).
13. See, e.g., Panel Report, European Communities-Protection of Trademarks and
Geographic Indication for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, WT/DS174/R (Mar. 15,
2005) [hereinafter EC-GI]. In the EC-GI case, the issue was whether the EC discriminated
against non-EC nationals by making recognition of geographic indications contingent on re-
ceiving a domestic certification from the home country of the non-EC national. Although it
would be difficult to obtain a certification in a nation that lacks the investigatory machinery
required by the EC regulation, the EC argued that the condition for protection was not dis-
crimination against nationals because anyone seeking a geographical indication that
references an EC locality can utilize the EC system. Nonetheless, the Panel found the system
discriminatory, reasoning that the TRIPS Agreement requires "effective equality of opportuni-
ties" and focuses on "actual effects of the contested provisions in the marketplace."
14. Report of WTO Dispute Settlement Panel, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharma-
ceutical Products, [4.6 n. 27, WT/DS114/R (March 17, 2000) [hereinafter Canada-
Pharmaceuticals].
15. Id.
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from dissipating resources by demanding special forms of protection.
While such an objective has much to recommend it and a panel has
noted with some approval the notion of TRIPS as a check on certain do-
mestic political pressures (such as anti-foreigner legislation),' 6 it is far
from clear that the TRIPS Agreement was actually meant to protect the
structure of any particular domestic political economy. Indeed, the effect
that TRIPS might have on domestic political structures is quite complex.
The combined effect of giving strict international scrutiny to legislation
impinging on producer interests while leaving domestic legislatures with
considerable discretion over abrogating user interests is that legislative
deals tend to unravel, and to do so in only one direction: a direction that
favors the owners of intellectual property. The best example here is one
drawn from copyright, where the United States lengthened the copyright
term and at the same time, added new exemptions for playing music in
Irish (and other) bars. The Irish bar provision was struck down by the
WTO in the US-1 10(5) case, 7 but the term extension was upheld in El-
dred v. Ashcroft." International rules that give members more flexibility
would at least avoid the unidirectional unraveling problem. Furthermore,
a "light" ban on de facto discrimination---one that permits a member to
justify its actions-may be enough to prevent the more egregious forms
of rent seeking while still allowing states to tailor their law effectively.
Additionally, requiring exemptions to be available for all forms of
technology as a matter of international law could distort domestic law by
inducing national legislators to adopt exemptions that are broader than
necessary. This outcome would also conflict with the basic thrust of Ar-
ticle 30, which expressly requires any given exemption to be "limited." A
targeted exemption that differentiated between different types of inven-
tion would limit a patentee's rights only in areas where there was a
perceived imbalance between public and private rights. 9 A formalist
over-commitment to technological neutrality is inconsistent with this
purposive reading of the TRIPS Agreement. In the end then, for these
and a series of other reasons that we have written about at length, we
think the Panel was wrong to subject exemptions to the technological
neutrality condition.
But even if one were to accept the possibility that the Canada-
Pharmaceuticals panel reached the right conclusion and that Article 27 is
in some respects structural, strong arguments can be made that there is
16. Id.
17. Panel Report, United States - Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R
(Jun. 15, 2001).
18. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). See generally, Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the
Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking, supra note 9.
19. See Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, WTO Dispute Resolution, supra note 9, at 876-877.
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still considerable room for tailoring. Thus, the language of the provision
itself may contain latitude to create some level of differentiation. Over
the past ten years, arguments grounded in text have proved to have im-
mense attraction to the WTO dispute settlement body in TRIPS cases.
Thus, attention to text may, for example, support Brian Kahin's sugges-
tion that the "availability" of patent rights should be regarded as subject
to more stringent anti-discrimination scrutiny than the "enjoyment" of
patent rights." Certainly, the basic purpose of Article 27 was focused on
wholesale exclusions, which seems to suggest that its "availability" pro-
visions should receive more serious international examination. We,
however, do not think it is plausible to parse Article 27 in this way: from
a grammatical standpoint (if nothing else), it is difficult to have confi-
dence that the legal effect of "availability" and "enjoyment" can be
separated.
Instead, we propose that any interpretation of Article 27 should re-
quire greater attention to the term "discrimination., 2' Discrimination is
not the same as differential treatment.22 The Canada-Pharmaceuticals
panel acknowledged that "Article 27 does not prohibit bona fide exemp-
tions to deal with problems that may exist only in certain product
areas."23 We see at least three arguments that support such differential
treatment. First, as suggested earlier and as the pieces in this volume at-
test, different sectors experience different problems within the current
patent system. Under a normal meaning of the term "discrimination,"
treating different cases differently is not discrimination. For example, it
may not be discrimination to create exceptions to broad patents out of
the concern that they dominate too broad a swath of the technological
frontier, while giving the holder of a narrow patent the right to exploit
the entire domain of his claim. At the end of the day, the value of the
exclusivity offered to different technologies is similar.
Second, we note that many of the proposals for tailoring are not
aimed at the nominal legal rights created by patent law, but rather at the
economic effects of these patents: for example, the transactional costs
20. Brian Kahin, Patents and Diversity in Innovation, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L.
REV. 389 (2007).
21. The panel almost invites this line of analysis in Canada-Patent Pharmaceuticals,
when it declined to provide a comprehensive definition of "discrimination" within the mean-
ing of art. 27, but instead sought to "define the concept of discrimination to the extent
necessary to resolve [the issued raised before the panel.]" Canada-Pharmaceuticals, supra
note 14, at 7.98.
22. Cf id. at 7.94 (noting the dangers of assimilating "discrimination" and "differen-
tial treatment" while suggesting that discrimination can result from nominally identical
treatment, and differential treatment might be justified). See also id. at 7.101 (listing issues
arising in cases of de facto discrimination).
23. Canada-Pharmaceuticals, supra note 14, at 1 7.92.
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associated with patent thickets or the holdouts possible when many pat-
ents are required to bring a product to market. Differentiation targeted at
such effects arguably finds explicit support in the Canada-
Pharmaceuticals report.24 In that case, the EU argued that Canada was
interfering with the internationally guaranteed rights of patentees by in-
truding upon the ability of pharmaceutical companies to retain a measure
of exclusivity after patent expiration. Specifically, the EU claimed that
generic manufacturers should not be permitted to conduct the tests nec-
essary for regulatory review during the patent term because those
activities allowed the generics to come to market as soon as the patent
expired, thus destroying the lead time advantage the (ex-) patent holder
would otherwise enjoy. The panel rejected the argument. Post-term ex-
clusivity was not the "natural or normal consequence" of enforcing
patent rights. Rather, it was a product of the combination of patent law
and regulatory approval that the panel saw as a commercial or economic
effect, instead of a legal effect, and thus not the type of exploitation
TRIPS was intended to protect.
Admittedly, rejecting the relevance of effects in assessing compli-
ance with international patent obligations could-if extended too
broadly as an interpretive device-undermine our own efforts in certain
circumstances to assess and justify discrimination by reference to mar-
ketplace effects. On the other hand, if we read the report more narrowly
and confine it to its core holding, it can be understood simply as saying
that benefits flowing from non-patent law realities (such as alterations in
industry structure or changing relationships between science and tech-
nology) cannot be the basis for a claim of guaranteed rights. This latter
interpretation, which is more favorable to our argument that we can look
at the overall and net effects of a tailored system, is consistent with the
idea that the TRIPS Agreement is aimed primarily at ensuring minimum
rights.
A third argument allowing for the development of industry specific
laws focuses on the nature of the discrimination. In the Canada-
Pharmaceuticals report, the panel rejected the argument that Canada's
regulatory review exception was technology-specific.26 Any patent in an
industry that was subject to marketing approval would be subject to the
challenged exception. Thus, the Canadian exception was not regarded as
24. Canada-Pharmaceuticals, supra note 14, at 7.57-58 (discussing normal exploita-
tion under Article 30).
25. Cf Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Law-
making, supra note 9, at 112-113 (arguing "that adjudicators should take into account how
changing social practices and new technological opportunities alter the balance of protection
accorded to innovative works").
26. Canada-Pharmaceuticals, supra note 14, at 7.102.
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effecting a de iure discrimination. Of course, the analysis did not stop
there; the panel's report must also be read as prohibiting de facto dis-
crimination.2 ' However, it does so only in specific circumstances-when
the claim includes some additional element, such as an allegation of in-
tent to discriminate.28 We think it is entirely appropriate that those
claiming de facto discrimination should be required to demonstrate some
element over and above those required to establish de iure cases of dis-
crimination.
But what is the extra element? The Canada-Pharmaceuticals panel
does not give us a definitive answer. The panel clearly thought that pur-
pose was relevant. In some passages, the panel imposed a burden on the
complainant to demonstrate that the application of a law in a facially
neutral manner was a sham. 29 Were that the sole means of proving de
facto discrimination, the various forms of tailoring discussed in this con-
ference would likely survive scrutiny. However, the panel also suggested
that the complainant could show that "objective indications of purpose
demonstrated a purpose to impose disadvantages on [particular indus-
tries]". ° Whatever that formulation means, a broad reading appears to
endanger all forms of tailoring since they are all intended to effects dif-
ferent industries differently. Further, such an approach appears to
collapse de iure and de facto claims.
We suggest that those defending an exclusion as compliant with Ar-
ticle 27 should be permitted to rebut a showing of disparate treatment by
demonstrating a legitimate purpose.3' We think that this is consistent
with Article 1(1) of the TRIPS Agreement, which gives countries defer-
ence as to the means by which they implement the general purposes of
the TRIPS Agreement. As has been suggested, TRIPS to some extent
assumes the character of a "constitutional" international law or a "basic
law." In a number of countries, constitutional law has developed a vari-
27. This interpretation of TRIPS Article 3 does not dictate that panels take the same
approach to technological discrimination in the context of Article 27. National treatment im-
plicates foundational aspects of the WTO system, and any derogation from it is inherently
suspect. This is not true of Article 27; technological differentiation can in fact effectuate the
purposes of the Agreement. To put this another way, the EC-GI panel was trying to avoid
protectionism, but the goal of tailoring is not to protect local markets from foreign competi-
tion: it is intended to make local marketplaces work more efficiently for everyone. Thus, it is
by no means clear that nondiscrimination among peoples (certainly a goal of public interna-
tional law and the focus of the EC-GI case) and nondiscrimination among technologies (per
the panel's interpretation of Article 27) are objectives of equal importance to the international
intellectual property system.
28. Canada-Pharmaceuticals, supra note 14, at 7.105.
29. Id. at 7.104.
30. Id. at 7.105.
31. Cf id. at 1 7.94 (noting that the "standards by which the justification for differential
treatment is measured are a subject of infinite complexity").
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ety of tests to assess whether there is a sufficient means-ends nexus to
support a statute. For example, one could consider whether the stated
objectives behind the law were in any way furthered by the legislative
means chosen, or whether it was a rational means, or a particularly ap-
propriate means, or a well-tailored means, or the least burdensome
means, of pursuing these objectives.
At the very least, we believe that panels may need a way to evaluate
the relation between the stated purpose and the means chosen.32 Thus,
differentiation might be satisfied by, for example, demonstrating a close
linkage between the exclusion and the particular change in organiza-
tional or institutional structure in the country in question. An example
might be a law tailored to deal with the problems created by the decision
to extend patenting to fundamental research, or the unique problems en-
countered when patents serve functions other than protection from free-
riding.33 Developing this type of analysis would also open up space to
incorporate the economic and empirical work described in this volume,
furthering Brian Kahin's call for patent law to expand its horizons in de-
veloping policy.3
Given that analysis, it is evident that the TRIPS Agreement leaves
ample room for a member state to adopt most of the initiatives discussed
at the outset. Lemley and Burk's legally neutral rules, applied though
adjudication, certainly appear to survive challenge. Legislatively con-
structed industry-specific rules could also be sustained if they were
framed in a similarly neutral manner. For example, rules that changed
the remedies available for infringement could past muster if proxies for
the targeted technologies, such as "discrete product industries" and
"complex product industries," were utilized. Indeed, the Canada-
Pharmaceuticals panel implicitly permitted use of such a conceptual
proxy when it was willing to analyze the Canadian law as being about
inventions "subject to marketing approval., 3 The pharmaceutical indus-
try was what Canada meant, but that is not what the statute said, and the
panel approved it on that basis.
32. Of course, it might be argued that had such an assessment been expected, the draft-
ers would have written the standard into the Agreement. Cf Agreement on Technical Barriers
to Trade, art. 2(2), Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, Legal Instruments-Results of
the Uruguay Round, vol. 27 (1994), http://www.wto.org/English/docs-e/legal e/1 7-tbt.pdf
(requiring a member state to show that the measure in question was the least trade-restrictive
possible, etc.).
33. This would include the so-called trolling problem, see Carol M. Nielsen & Michael
R. Samardzija, Compulsory Patent Licensing: Is It a Viable Solution in the United States, 13
MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 509 (2007).
34. Kahin, supra note 20.
35. Cf. Canada-Pharmaceuticals, supra note 14, at 7.99.
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Nor is this merely semantics. Thus, it has been suggested that the
differentiation between complex and discrete product industries is artifi-
cial because even pharmaceuticals (the quintessential discrete products)
are susceptible to multiple claiming strategies.36 To be sure, this move
would turn the pharmaceutical industry into a complex product indus-
try.33 But if that happened, then presumably the pharmaceutical industry
would begin to experience the transaction costs and holdout problems
that currently plague information technologies. If so, then a conceptually
neutral rule would prove its value: there would be no need to plead for
special legislation when a readily available solution is already on the
books.38
By the same token, special rules for industries subject to network ef-
fects, standard setting, or lock-in should be acceptable. If the special rule
were intended to limit the exclusivity that is derived from the network
effect-the tipping of the market in favor of the patented product-then
what the Canada-Pharmaceuticals panel had to say about disregarding
commercial effects that do not arise solely from the patent would pre-
sumably be relevant. After all, the value derived from a tipped market
(from being included in a standard or a network) is not a predictable part
of the marketing opportunities produced by the patent. Since it would
not be a legal effect (not a part of the patentee's "normal" market), there
may be ways in which members are free to cut it back.3 9
Initiatives to deal with the industries in which the patent/product ra-
tio is less than one could presumably be analyzed in the same way. Here
is an area where there is a live example: Germany recently enacted a
special rule to deal with the broad scope of gene patents. Under the new
provision, a gene patent creates an exclusive right over the uses recited
in the application, but permits the public to otherwise utilize the gene
36. Robert A. Armitage, Comment, The Myth of Inherent and Inevitable "Industry
Differences": "Diversity" As Artifact in the Quest for Patent Reforms, 13 MICH. TELECOMM.
TECH. L. REv. 401 (2007).
37. Cf Cohen et al., R&D Spillovers, supra note 4 (describing how a discrete product
industry in the United States can be complex in Japan because of differences in claiming
norms).
38. The public choice effects of different interpretations of TRIPS are hard to assess.
See Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking,
supra note 9. But the Canada-Pharmaceuticals panel was receptive to the idea that some of the
provisions of the Agreement were designed to bolster domestic political structures in ways
that minimize counterproductive pressures that public choice theory could predict in a global
system still largely effectuated through national political institutions. See Canada-
Pharmaceuticals, supra note 14, at 7.92 (noting the plausibility of the EC's argument that
some of the provisions of TRIPS might have been intended to "ensure that governments do not
succumb to [certain] domestic pressures").
39. Members would not have complete discretion. For example, we doubt that they
could curtail the term of a patent. Article 33 makes the required term crystal clear. See TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 8, art. 33.
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free of the patentee's control)" As framed, this provision clearly carves
out biotechnology inventions for special treatment. If challenged, Ger-
many is likely to have a difficult time defending this law.4' Nonetheless,
the problems associated with a patent-to-product ratio far below one are
arguable severe: the patentee acquires rights out of proportion to what it
invented.42 Further, the patent can dominate a range of applications far
broader than it has the knowledge to exploit. Framing a statute so that it
is neutrally applied in every case in which the ratio is less than one (a
term like "discrete" or "complex" has yet to be invented) could pass
muster, if it is sufficiently limited.
A harder case is presented by proposals to deal with the special
needs of a particular industry through administrative agencies (such as
the FDA) that regulate the industry in question. First, it is not always the
case that the desirable variations in the patent system will be coextensive
with a particular industrial sector. For example, product-to-patent ratios
can be high for some products in an industry, but not for others. Using
the scope of regulatory authority over an industry as the proxy for differ-
entiation may fail to effectuate the domestic patent objective; it may be
both under- and over-inclusive and thus could weaken the nexus between
ends and means. Second, surely a measure cannot evade review by the
simple expedient of placing it in nonpatent legislation (for example, by
burying it somewhere in the U.S. code other than title 35). Indeed, the
trademark measures challenged in the so-called Havana Club case were
not part of the U.S. intellectual property statutes, but the WTO nonethe-
less analyzed the restrictions on Cuban marks under the TRIPS
Agreement.4 '3 Furthermore, it may be significant that the TRIPS Agree-
ment specifically provides leeway for antitrust authorities, but not for
other administrative agencies, to pursue their regulatory objectives not-
withstanding intrusion upon the rights otherwise guaranteed by the
TRIPS Agreement." Nonetheless, it seems to us that the presence of a
regulation within a broader regulatory scheme, such as food and drug
40. Patentgesetz [PatG] [Patent Law] May 5, 1936, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI II], 117, as
amended, § I a, 4.
41. The German law, which bars the patentee from controlling any use other than those
found at the time of the application, may be too broad to qualify under Article 30, even if it
can survive Article 27's technological neutrality requirement. Id.
42. See NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, THE ETHICS OF PATENTING DNA 13
(2002), available at http://www.nuffieidbioethics.org/fileLibrary/pdf/ theethicsofpatenting-
dna.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2005) (suggesting that the returns from genomic patents far
exceed the technical contribution made by the patentees).
43. Panel Report, United States-Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriation Act of 1998,
WT/DSl76/R (Aug. 6, 2001).
44. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 3 1(k).
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law, can furnish powerful support for a claim of a rational relationship to
legitimate purposes.
CONCLUSION
Certainly, there are many valid critiques of international lawmaking:
there are issues of both transparency and institutional capture. Nonethe-
less, we take seriously and give weight to the normative claims of the
TRIPS Agreement to facilitate and enhance free trade. But we think that
industry-specific patent laws are fully consistent with the comparative
advantage philosophy that undergirds the modern trade regime. After all,
national patent laws reflect local technological capacity. For example, a
nation whose comparative advantage lies in upstream research may want
to patent fundamental discoveries, but one that specializes in manufac-
tured products may wish to put fundamental discoveries in the public
domain while providing strong protection to end products. By the same
token, a nation that excels in complex product industries will want to
fashion law that deals with the problems that complexity creates. A rigid
requirement that each member treat all fields alike potentially interferes
with a nation's ability to fully develop its own technological possibili-
ties.
Admittedly, it could be argued that the TRIPS Agreement is de-
signed to prevent nations from instantiating advantages through their
patent laws. However, wide-ranging legal advantages persist under the
WTO. For example, banking and securities laws make it easier for entre-
preneurs to attract capital, and labor laws make it easier for employers to
keep prices down. Until all the laws relevant to trade are harmonized, it
is anomalous to read such inflexibility into the TRIPS Agreement, espe-
cially when it has such strong potential to undermine the WTO's
capacity to increase social welfare. A better approach is to view TRIPS
as an effort to create an efficient marketplace and to treat its minimum
substantive requirements as safeguards against one country using its pat-
ent law to undermine the industrial policy of another. If TRIPS needs an
overarching goal and an interpretive principle to identify the limits on
tailoring, then efficiency-of-trade recommends itself as the right focus.
